AJIBM  Vol.10 No.4 , April 2020
A Review of the Relationship between Agency Cost and Corporate Investment Efficiency
Abstract: Investment is the direct driving force for the survival and development of a corporate. Improving the efficiency of corporate investment is vital to the corporate value. And agency cost directly affects a series of business behaviors and results. This article reviews the agency costs, corporate investment efficiency, and the relationship between them, and studies how to improve corporate investment efficiency from the perspective of reducing agency costs.
Cite this paper: Li, S. (2020) A Review of the Relationship between Agency Cost and Corporate Investment Efficiency. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 10, 734-748. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2020.104050.

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