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 AJIBM  Vol.9 No.12 , December 2019
The Impact of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge on R&D Investment
Abstract: Based on the perspective of control rights shifting, this paper investigates whether the equity pledge of controlling shareholders will decrease the R&D investment of companies in a sample of 2010-2017 years’ non-financial listed companies with A-share in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The study found that the controlling shareholder equity pledge has negative impact on company R&D investment.
Cite this paper: Chen, J. (2019) The Impact of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge on R&D Investment. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 9, 2129-2143. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2019.912141.
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