AJIBM  Vol.9 No.10 , October 2019
Independent Directors and Enterprise Technology Innovation
Abstract: Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 1996 to 2016, the paper uses the panel double fixed model to study the impact of the company’s transition to a larger proportion of independent directors on corporate innovation behavior. It is concluded that the increase in the proportion of independent directors of the company can make the number of patents of the company significant. Increased conclusions. Compared with invention patents, non-invention patent applications have increased more, and the increase in independent directors has prompted managers to pay more attention to the benefits and risks of innovation. At the same time, based on the DID model, this paper analyzes the impact of the minimum independent director policy ratio on the company’s innovation activities. The study finds that the minimum independent director ratio policy allows private companies to lower their minimum proportion of companies and increase their strategic innovation behavior, instead of seeking exploration and breakthroughs in new technologies.
Cite this paper: Hu, X. and Sun, X. (2019) Independent Directors and Enterprise Technology Innovation. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 9, 1915-1930. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2019.910125.

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