JWARP  Vol.11 No.10 , October 2019
Can One Drink Informal Water Alternatives Directly? Using Mobile Phone to Establish Trust in Quality
Abstract: The informal water market in cities within the Global South is expanding, thanks to drought associated water shortage challenges and other socio-hydrological factors. A midst the growth is the inherent information signal asymmetry driven mainly by the vendors’ unwillingness to share the actual quality data of their source water with their customers. As a result a big mistrust environment has been created as currently; the customers have no mechanism to verify the water quality in real time. This paper aimed at developing an android application software system to fill the gap. The system is to operate the water vending business landscape as a trusted social network site (SNS) using handheld mobile phone devices. An Agile-Scrum methodology was utilized as it allows for quick changes to the system as necessary. An android platform was chosen as the initial Operating System (OS) to run the software system due to its faster global outreach capability. Specifically, Android Studio 3.4.2 IDE running on Windows 10 was deployed. And the primary languages used within the IDE were; Kotlin for the functionality and XML for the user interface (UI). Additionally, the Firebase SDK tools were used for cloud-based database functionality. The results of the prototype include; user side access and feedback exchanges, backend side supports and other added functionalities. The paper is of the strong view that since the system works on anytime-anywhere modality, then it is possible that one can drink the informal water directly. The system is recommended for full scale trial in the affected cities.
Cite this paper: Ochungo, E. , Ouma, G. , Obiero, J. and Odero, N. (2019) Can One Drink Informal Water Alternatives Directly? Using Mobile Phone to Establish Trust in Quality. Journal of Water Resource and Protection, 11, 1260-1277. doi: 10.4236/jwarp.2019.1110073.

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