Two Level Principal-Agent Analysis in Farmland Transfer

Hui  Shen; Yaxiang  Liu

doi:10.4236/ajibm.2019.93028

Hui Shen, Yaxiang Liu^*

Abstract:

With the acceleration of urbanization, a large number of rural labor forces have been transferred. As the basic means of production, land circulation is becoming more and more frequent. Scale management and land circulation have become the necessary trend of agricultural modernization. Based on the purpose of maximizing the interests of the participants and further optimizing the allocation efficiency of land resources in the process of land transfer, this paper constructs a dual principal-agent model of farmers and intermediary organizations, intermediary organizations and scale operators, which is multi-to-one and one-to-many principal-agent relationship respectively, and finds out the optimal level of effort. Finally, it analyses the influence of different factors on the interests, and puts forward some suggestions to the principal and agent based on the analysis results, in order to promote the further development of the land circulation market.

Keywords: Land Circulation, Principal-Agent, Peasant Household, Intermediary Organization, Scale Management Main Body

Cite this paper: Shen, H. and Liu, Y. (2019) Two Level Principal-Agent Analysis in Farmland Transfer. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 9, 427-438. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2019.93028.

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