AJIBM  Vol.8 No.10 , October 2018
Does the Central Government’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Have an Impact on Corporate Cost Stickiness?
Abstract: This paper starts with the anti-corruption campaign of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), adopts the empirical method to study whether and how the anti-corruption campaign of the central government influences the cost stickiness of enterprises. And the paper further studies whether the anti-corruption campaign has different impacts on enterprises with different property rights. The results show that the cost stickiness of listed companies decreases significantly after the anti-corruption campaign. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the cost stickiness of state-owned enterprises weakened less after the anti-corruption campaign started. The research results of this paper show that anti-corruption can restrain the rent-seeking behavior of enterprises and make them apply more resources to normal production and operation activities.
Cite this paper: Wang, S. (2018) Does the Central Government’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Have an Impact on Corporate Cost Stickiness?. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 8, 2102-2119. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2018.810139.

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