AJIBM  Vol.8 No.4 , April 2018
Credit Distortion, Firm Nature and Investment Efficiency
Abstract: Credit is the foremost external source of funds for enterprises. The allocation rationality of credit fund directly affects corporate financing constraints and further manipulates business investment actions. Based on government intervention, the credit market in China presents certain degree of allocation distortion, which means that state-owned companies have quantity and cost advantages over non state-owned companies in respect of the acquisition of credit resources. Taking listed A share in 2008-2015 as the samples, the thesis firstly introduces the interprovincial variables of credit allocation distortion to quantify external credit allocation distortion degree faced by companies and study investment inefficiency problems in state-owned companies and non state-owned companies. As proved by the empirical results: 1) comparing with state-owned companies, non state-owned companies encounter more grievous problems in underinvestment and overinvestment; 2) the aggravation of regional credit allocation distortion degree will significantly intensify overinvestment of state-owned companies and underinvestment of non state-owned companies in local regions. It fully indicates that the imbalance of credit resource allocation will encumber corporate investment efficiency.
Cite this paper: Chen, L. (2018) Credit Distortion, Firm Nature and Investment Efficiency. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 8, 867-880. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2018.84060.

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