GEP  Vol.5 No.9 , September 2017
The Study on Urban Agglomeration Environmental Rights Trading Paradigm—With the Emission Trading Model of Wan-Jiang City Belt
Abstract: As the deterioration of the modern environmental problems, developed countries started to explore concrete ways of internalization of external effects produced by environmental problems. The theory of new institutional economics which produced the environmental property theory is widely used in the research of environmental management. On the premise of total amount control of pollution, the subjects of public power distribute or sell the rights is the basic paradigm of this method. Buyers take possession of the rights and utilize, profit from or dispose of them. The coordinated development of urban agglomeration is the main direction of China’s regional development strategy. As there are differences in environmental governance in different cities, the environment property trading system of urban agglomeration needs to be established urgently. Due to environmental property’s complexity and its attributes of public goods, the transaction of environmental property is restricted by amounts of factors. This research concludes that it is necessary to define the possessor of environmental property, strengthen the construction of trading platform, improving the public participation and supervision mechanism and control transaction cost by establishing and analyzing the emission trading model of the city-cluster along the Yangtze River in Anhui Province.
Cite this paper: Wei, X. , Wang, M. , Duan, Y. and Peng, X. (2017) The Study on Urban Agglomeration Environmental Rights Trading Paradigm—With the Emission Trading Model of Wan-Jiang City Belt. Journal of Geoscience and Environment Protection, 5, 296-315. doi: 10.4236/gep.2017.59020.

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