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 TEL  Vol.7 No.6 , October 2017
Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes
Abstract: I analyze the two-group contest with the group-specific public-goods prize when each player decides on the timing of their moves endogenously and individually. Unlike the previous papers, I show that free riders suffer a damage in the endogenous-timing framework because the decision on the endogenous timing adversely affects the behavior of free riders, by making them more egotistical.
Cite this paper: Lee, J. (2017) Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes. Theoretical Economics Letters, 7, 1660-1666. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.76112.
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