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 JFRM  Vol.5 No.3 , September 2016
Board Advising, Risk-Taking, and Firm Performance
Abstract:
The corporate risk-taking has caught public attention due to the global financial crisis. Using a sample of listed companies in China from 2008 to 2015, this paper investigates how the role of board advising affects corporate risk-taking and the possible economics consequences of risk-taking. The empirical results show that the percentage of advisory directors is positively associated with the level of corporate risk-taking, and the interaction of the percentage of advisory directors and risk-taking is positively correlated with the future firm performance. However, these effects are not significant at all in the state-owned enterprises due to government’s interference.
Cite this paper: Li, J. (2016) Board Advising, Risk-Taking, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Risk Management, 5, 149-160. doi: 10.4236/jfrm.2016.53015 .
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