JFRM  Vol.5 No.3 , September 2016
Game Analysis of Cooperation between Start-Up and Venture Investor
This article divides the cooperation between start-ups and venture investors into non-property cooperation and property cooperation. On the basis, it sets up a dynamic game model of complete information to figure out the corresponding Nash equilibrium. And the game analysis results indicate that during the cooperative game process of start-up and venture investor, the higher extra input the venture investor needs to provide, the more likely the both sides are to choose non-property cooperation; the higher profits the success of the venture project may bring, the more likely the entrepreneurial firm is to choose property cooperation.
Cite this paper: Chen, Q. (2016) Game Analysis of Cooperation between Start-Up and Venture Investor. Journal of Financial Risk Management, 5, 113-121. doi: 10.4236/jfrm.2016.53013.

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