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 OJPP  Vol.1 No.1 , August 2011
Pretense Theory and the Imported Background
Abstract: Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.
Cite this paper: nullGoodman, J. (2011). Pretense Theory and the Imported Background. Open Journal of Philosophy, 1, 22-25. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2011.11004.
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