The paper does not meet the standards of
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This article has been retracted to
straighten the academic record. In making this decision the Editorial Board
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standards on publication ethics. The Editorial Board would like to extend its
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Editor guiding this retraction: Prof. Moawia
Alghalith (EiC of TEL)
retraction notice in PDF is
preceding the original paper, which is marked "RETRACTED".
 Silvers, R. (2012) The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Post Contracting Case. Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 352-365. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002
 Holmstrom, B. (1979) Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
 Crémer, J. (1995) Arm’s Length Relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 275-295.
 Hart, O. and Moore, J. (2008) Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1-48.
 Fehr, E., Hart, O. and Zehnder, C. (2011) Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence. American Economic Review, 101, 493-525. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.493
 Hamming, R. (1950) Error Detecting and Error Correcting Codes. Bell System Technical Journal, 29, 147-160.