TEL  Vol.6 No.3 , June 2016
RETRACTED: Garbling in the Principal’s Monitoring Device
Author(s) Prateek Goorha
ABSTRACT

Short Retraction Notice

The paper does not meet the standards of "Theoretical Economics Letters".

This article has been retracted to straighten the academic record. In making this decision the Editorial Board follows COPE's Retraction Guidelines. The aim is to promote the circulation of scientific research by offering an ideal research publication platform with due consideration of internationally accepted standards on publication ethics. The Editorial Board would like to extend its sincere apologies for any inconvenience this retraction may have caused.

Editor guiding this retraction: Prof. Moawia Alghalith (EiC of TEL)

The full retraction notice in PDF is preceding the original paper, which is marked "RETRACTED".


Cite this paper
  
References
[1]   Silvers, R. (2012) The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Post Contracting Case. Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 352-365.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002

[2]   Holmstrom, B. (1979) Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320

[3]   Crémer, J. (1995) Arm’s Length Relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 275-295.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118440

[4]   Hart, O. and Moore, J. (2008) Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1-48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1

[5]   Fehr, E., Hart, O. and Zehnder, C. (2011) Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence. American Economic Review, 101, 493-525.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.493

[6]   Hamming, R. (1950) Error Detecting and Error Correcting Codes. Bell System Technical Journal, 29, 147-160.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1950.tb00463.x

 
 
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