AM  Vol.6 No.12 , November 2015
Multicriteria Partial Cooperative Games
In this paper, we study an approach to environmental topics, through multicriteria partial cooperative games. In general, not all players wish to cooperate to solve a common problem, so we consider a model where only some decision-makers cooperate. Starting from the transformation of a coalition game into a strategic one, we give a new concept of solution for partial cooperative models proving an existence theorem.

Cite this paper
Pieri, G. and Pusillo, L. (2015) Multicriteria Partial Cooperative Games. Applied Mathematics, 6, 2125-2131. doi: 10.4236/am.2015.612186.

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