The Impact of the Game between Stakeholders on the Protection of Farmland
ABSTRACT
Arable land is a scarce resource with multiple values. However, the rapid development of urbanization and industrialization has posed an enormous challenge on the protection of it. This paper will first analyze three relative parties: farmers, local governments and central government. And then game theory will be used to study the behavior of these three parties so as to facilitate the conservation of farmland.
Arable land is a scarce resource with multiple values. However, the rapid development of urbanization and industrialization has posed an enormous challenge on the protection of it. This paper will first analyze three relative parties: farmers, local governments and central government. And then game theory will be used to study the behavior of these three parties so as to facilitate the conservation of farmland.
Cite this paper
Li, F. and Zhou, W. (2015) The Impact of the Game between Stakeholders on the Protection of Farmland. Agricultural Sciences, 6, 1317-1323. doi: 10.4236/as.2015.611126.
Li, F. and Zhou, W. (2015) The Impact of the Game between Stakeholders on the Protection of Farmland. Agricultural Sciences, 6, 1317-1323. doi: 10.4236/as.2015.611126.
References
[1] Tang, R. (2009) Present Situation and Utilization Policies of Cultivated Land Resources in China. Modern Agricultural Science and Technology, 12. [2] Freeman (1984) Strategic Management: Analysis Approach of Stakeholder Management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [3] Jiang, R.M. and Jin, Y.H. (2009) Corporate Stakeholder Theory and Application. Peking University Press. [4] Fu, S.Y. (2011) Characteristics and Prospect of the Transformation of Government Functions in China. [5] Zhang, L.Q. and Feng, C.W. (2001) Rationality and Bounded Rationality: Classical Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory. The World Economy, 8. [6] Bester, H. and Guth, W. (1998) Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34. [7] Jasmina, A. and John, L. (2004) Scaling up Learning Models in Public Good Games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 6. [8] Zheng, L.J. (2012) Interests Coordinating Mechanism Building of Cultivated Land Protection in China. Master’s Thesis, Fujian Normal University.
[1] Tang, R. (2009) Present Situation and Utilization Policies of Cultivated Land Resources in China. Modern Agricultural Science and Technology, 12. [2] Freeman (1984) Strategic Management: Analysis Approach of Stakeholder Management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [3] Jiang, R.M. and Jin, Y.H. (2009) Corporate Stakeholder Theory and Application. Peking University Press. [4] Fu, S.Y. (2011) Characteristics and Prospect of the Transformation of Government Functions in China. [5] Zhang, L.Q. and Feng, C.W. (2001) Rationality and Bounded Rationality: Classical Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory. The World Economy, 8. [6] Bester, H. and Guth, W. (1998) Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34. [7] Jasmina, A. and John, L. (2004) Scaling up Learning Models in Public Good Games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 6. [8] Zheng, L.J. (2012) Interests Coordinating Mechanism Building of Cultivated Land Protection in China. Master’s Thesis, Fujian Normal University.