Radio Spectrum Valuation by Using Censored Regression Method

Nattakit  Suriyakrai; Noppadol  Tiamnara; Settapong  Malisuwan

doi:10.4236/ajibm.2015.511065

Settapong Malisuwan, Noppadol Tiamnara, Nattakit Suriyakrai

Abstract: Currently, the mobile markets in every country all around the world have been developing rapidly. The adoption of 3G and 4G services will greatly benefit the economy. Consumers will receive fast and quality telecommunication system and their quality of life will improve. Such development will be beneficial to the production of goods and service in countries raising overall competitiveness both domestically and internationally. Radio spectrum is scarce and invaluable telecommunication resource. Spectrum auction should determine spectrum value as consistent to its actual value. In order to ensure that spectrum is efficiently assigned, spectrum is priced to reflect the value it can add to help promote economic and technical efficiency with users who have bid for it. Putting a price on spectrum not only ensures spectrum management efficiency, but also can add revenue for the government which will in turn cover the cost of spectrum. This paper presents a radio spectrum valuation method by using censored regression method. The contributions in this paper could assist telecom policy makers to gain more understanding in development of radio spectrum valuation.

Keywords: Radio Spectrum, Valuation, Censored Regression, Estimation

Cite this paper: Malisuwan, S. , Tiamnara, N. and Suriyakrai, N. (2015) Radio Spectrum Valuation by Using Censored Regression Method. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 5, 648-655. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2015.511065.

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