TEL  Vol.5 No.5 , October 2015
Implications of University Resource Allocation under Limited Internal Adjustability
ABSTRACT
This paper provides a theoretical framework for explaining counterintuitive behaviors of a university choosing an unfavorable consequence in the long term while attempting to optimally allocate its resources in the short term. Our analysis demonstrates the process through which conflicting interests among different departments within an institution may lead to an internal allocation arrangement, which would not necessarily yield the highest possible outcome for the whole.

Cite this paper
Abe, Y. and Watanabe, S. (2015) Implications of University Resource Allocation under Limited Internal Adjustability. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 637-646. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.55074.
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