JSS  Vol.3 No.9 , September 2015
A Game-Theoretic Model for Bystanders’ Behaviour in Classes with Bullying

In this paper, the behaviour of bystanders in a classroom in which bullying is occurring is analyzed using Game theory. We focus on bystander’s behaviour and formulate a threshold model. Our analysis shows that as class sizes become smaller, the probability of bullying being stopped increases.

Cite this paper
Isada, Y. , Igaki, N. and Shibata, A. (2015) A Game-Theoretic Model for Bystanders’ Behaviour in Classes with Bullying. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 3, 97-102. doi: 10.4236/jss.2015.39015.
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