TEL  Vol.5 No.4 , August 2015
Coordination Always Occurs in a Two-Strategy Pure-Coordination Logit Game on Scale-Free Networks
Author(s) Tomohiko Konno
We show that coordination always occurs in scale-free networks by social local interactions regardless of the values of parameters, while it occurs in regular networks if and only if the number of links times a payoff parameter exceeds the threshold. Scale-free networks are ubiquitous in the reality. We study a two-strategy pure coordination game on networks that indicate who plays with whom. A player chooses a strategy by Logit choice and the strategies are dynamically updated. Stable steady states are investigated.

Cite this paper
Konno, T. (2015) Coordination Always Occurs in a Two-Strategy Pure-Coordination Logit Game on Scale-Free Networks. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 561-570. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.54066.
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