Cite this paper
Wei, Q. and Liu, H. (2015) Research of the Game and Countermeasure about Collusion between Executives of State-Owned Enterprises and Government Officials. Journal of Service Science and Management
, 536-544. doi: 10.4236/jssm.2015.84054
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