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 TEL  Vol.5 No.4 , August 2015
An Experimental Comparison between Self- and Third-Party Evaluations
Abstract: How to pick up the true meaning of messages exchanged in the laboratory is an important issue for experimental research. The present study investigates, by experimentally comparing self- and third-party evaluations, to what extent self-evaluations by message receivers can be relied on. After standard public-good game, subjects receive a free-form written message evaluating their decision and self-evaluate its content from their counterparts. Third-party evaluators also evaluate the content independently. A comparison between both evaluations shows that a significant proportion of them agree. Firm evidence of a self-serving bias cannot be found.
Cite this paper: Kumakawa, T. (2015) An Experimental Comparison between Self- and Third-Party Evaluations. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 453-457. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.54053.
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