TEL  Vol.5 No.4 , August 2015
An Experimental Comparison between Self- and Third-Party Evaluations
ABSTRACT
How to pick up the true meaning of messages exchanged in the laboratory is an important issue for experimental research. The present study investigates, by experimentally comparing self- and third-party evaluations, to what extent self-evaluations by message receivers can be relied on. After standard public-good game, subjects receive a free-form written message evaluating their decision and self-evaluate its content from their counterparts. Third-party evaluators also evaluate the content independently. A comparison between both evaluations shows that a significant proportion of them agree. Firm evidence of a self-serving bias cannot be found.

Cite this paper
Kumakawa, T. (2015) An Experimental Comparison between Self- and Third-Party Evaluations. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 453-457. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.54053.
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