TEL  Vol.5 No.4 , August 2015
Manipulating Persuasion in Debates: Fact Checking’s Usefulness
Persuasion can be considered as a situation where subjects having an opinion or an argument are willing to change it in favor of others’ proposal only if the new message has personal relevance and significant consequences on their lives. In this paper, we argue that improvements in the information set and the knowledge of the fundamental rules of a “well-formed formula” are necessary to minimize errors when people make their choices. Arguments can be manipulated either in terms of the truth of premises or in terms of the logical connectives among propositions. The emerging mechanism of the so-called fact-checking, used to verify candidates’ statements during the electoral campaign, may be a very useful instrument to realize these improvements in political debates.

Cite this paper
Solferino, N. , Taurino, S. and Tessitore, M. (2015) Manipulating Persuasion in Debates: Fact Checking’s Usefulness. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 447-452. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.54052.
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