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 JCC  Vol.3 No.5 , May 2015
The Design and Research for Network Address Space Randomization in OpenFlow Network
Abstract: By allocating IP address and changing IP address in source and destination hosts, network address space randomization is committed to construct a dynamic and heterogeneous network to decrease the attacking possibility and predictability. The research mainly deploys the features of OpenFlow network including data plane and control plane decoupling, centralized control of the network and dynamic updating of forwarding rules, combines the advantages of the network address space randomization technology with the features of the OpenFlow network, and designs a novel resolution towards IP conversion in Floodlight controller. The research can help improve the unpredictability and decrease the possibility of worm attacking and IP sniffing by IP allocation.
Cite this paper: Zhao, Z. , Guo, Y. and Liu, W. (2015) The Design and Research for Network Address Space Randomization in OpenFlow Network. Journal of Computer and Communications, 3, 203-211. doi: 10.4236/jcc.2015.35026.
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