JSSM  Vol.7 No.6 , December 2014
Agent Risk Taking and Efforts in the Context of Multiple Heterogeneous References
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to discuss agent risk taking and efforts in the context of multiple heterogeneous references. We focus on two key references in terms of performance target and aspiration income. And we also introduce them into the principal-agent model. By the method of numerical simulation, our results show that performance target and the gap of psychological reference income have complex interaction influences on agent risk taking and efforts. In addition, profit-sharing coefficient plays moderating role in these complex relationships. Our results also provide good evidence and supplement to Pepper and Gore’s proposition.

Cite this paper
Wang, Q. , Wang, C. and Wan, L. (2014) Agent Risk Taking and Efforts in the Context of Multiple Heterogeneous References. Journal of Service Science and Management, 7, 411-418. doi: 10.4236/jssm.2014.76038.
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