OJPP  Vol.4 No.4 , November 2014
Epistemological Limits to Scientific Prediction: The Problem of Uncertainty
Author(s) Amanda Guillan
ABSTRACT
A key issue regarding the reliability of scientific prediction is uncertainty, which also affects its possibility as scientific knowledge. Thus, uncertainty is directly related to the epistemological limits of prediction in science. Within this context, this paper considers the obstacles to scientific predictions that are related to uncertainty. The analysis is made according to the twofold character of the limits of science, which is characterized in terms of the “barriers” and the “confines.” In addition, the study takes into account the presence of internal and external factors related to the epistemological limits of science. Following these lines of research, the analysis is focused on two steps. First, there is a characterization of the coordinates of Nicholas Rescher’s approach, which is particularly important regarding the epistemological limits to scientific prediction. Second, there is a study of uncertainty as an epistemological obstacle to predictability. Thereafter, the consequences for the future are pointed out.

Cite this paper
Guillan, A. (2014) Epistemological Limits to Scientific Prediction: The Problem of Uncertainty. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4, 510-517. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2014.44053.
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