JHRSS  Vol.2 No.3 , September 2014
Political Connections, Local Interests and Environmental Performance
ABSTRACT
Though there are studies on the relation between political connections and financial performance in the current literature, few have addressed the issue of political connections within the context of the environment. Thus, the goal of this study was to prove, in theory, that political connections and local interests negatively affect the environmental performance in the short and long run under the conditions faced by China.

Cite this paper
Yao, S. and Liang, H. (2014) Political Connections, Local Interests and Environmental Performance. Journal of Human Resource and Sustainability Studies, 2, 123-130. doi: 10.4236/jhrss.2014.23011.
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