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 OJPP  Vol.4 No.2 , May 2014
The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility
Abstract: In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.
Cite this paper: Alexander, L. (2014) The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4, 141-143. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2014.42019.
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