ME  Vol.5 No.4 , April 2014
Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry
Abstract: Foreclosure through raising a network rival’s costs may not be detrimental in the short-term, but in the longer-term it may allow a predator to expand its market share. The focus of antitrust opinion in assessing potential vertical mergers should therefore be on the longer-term effects of such mergers.
Cite this paper: Oyenuga, A. (2014) Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry. Modern Economy, 5, 443-460. doi: 10.4236/me.2014.54043.

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