TEL  Vol.4 No.3 , April 2014
Antidumping, Exchange Rate and Strategic Price Competition by Staged Game
ABSTRACT
When the dumpers have certain monopoly power to separate the domestic and foreign markets efficiently, and consider the higher elasticity of demand in foreign markets, the firms will sell the like products at lower prices in foreign markets for increasing market shares. In this study, the analysis from antidumping was provided to demonstrate the decision made by dumping behavior. Dumping is traditionally defined as a discriminating behavior of international prices. From the trade sphere, exchange rate plays an important role on evaluating “LTFV” (less than fair value) to cause the domestic industry to suffer “material injury”. Moreover, this article also discusses the equilibrium whether antidumping law exists or not under the consideration of profit maximization. A staged game is applied to analyzing the players’ behaviors and to influencing the decisions of government trade policies.

Cite this paper
Liu, H. and Wang, T. (2014) Antidumping, Exchange Rate and Strategic Price Competition by Staged Game. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 197-209. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.43028.
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