TEL  Vol.4 No.1 , February 2014
Peer-Pressure and Rational Underage Binge-Drinking
Abstract: This paper provides a utility-based definition of binge-drinking and examines the compatibility of this phenomenon with a rational decision making. Prohibition of young people’s consumption of alcohol is frequently violated by binge-drinking in groups. The analysis considers the roles of peer-pressure, full price of alcohol and crowding in underage group-drinking sessions and identifies the conditions for binge-drinking by expected utility maximizing members. Rational binge-drinking occurs when the impact of the peer-pressure on the individual member’s utility exceeds the loss of utility from the forgone spending on all other goods associated with the expected full marginal cost of consuming alcohol.
Cite this paper: A. Levy, "Peer-Pressure and Rational Underage Binge-Drinking," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2014, pp. 119-124. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.41018.

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