OJAcct  Vol.3 No.1 , January 2014
Related Party Transactions and Financial Performance: Is There a Correlation? Empirical Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
Related party transactions (RPTs) can have a dual nature. On one hand, these transactions may be considered sound business exchanges, fulfilling the economic needs of the company. On the other hand, RPTs may be considered a mechanism to exploit company resources as a consequence of existing conflicting interests. This study takes into account both aspects. Specifically, this paper investigates the relation between RPTs and companies’ financial performance, and thus verifies whether there is an association between these kinds of transactions and earnings management. This study examines the existence of this relation as regards the universe of Italian listed companies for the period of 2008-2011. According to the related data analysis, the research concludes that related party transactions and companies’ financial performance results are not correlated and that there is no evidence of a cause-effect relation. Therefore, related party transactions do not appear—thanks also to the existence of control mechanisms—a means used by Italian listed companies to realize earnings management, especially earnings smoothing.

Cite this paper
Pozzoli, M. and Venuti, M. (2014) Related Party Transactions and Financial Performance: Is There a Correlation? Empirical Evidence from Italian Listed Companies. Open Journal of Accounting, 3, 28-37. doi: 10.4236/ojacct.2014.31004.
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