NR  Vol.4 No.8 , December 2013
Collective Action in Common Pool Resource Management, Including Heterogeneity of Opportunities and Exit Options
Author(s) Pilar Useche*
ABSTRACT

The mechanism through which exit options and outside opportunities affect cooperation outcomes has not been well studied in the resource management literature, since a deep analysis of the concepts of exit options and outside opportunitiesis missing. This article analyzes these concepts across the common pool resource management literature, investigates the factors that underlie opting out decisions, and reviews potential ways to operationalize these concepts for empirical analysis. It also explores how the relationship of cooperation and exit options may be influenced by broad economic processes, such as economic integration.


Cite this paper
P. Useche, "Collective Action in Common Pool Resource Management, Including Heterogeneity of Opportunities and Exit Options," Natural Resources, Vol. 4 No. 8, 2013, pp. 483-489. doi: 10.4236/nr.2013.48059.
References
[1]   M. Olson, “The Logic of Collective Action,” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965.

[2]   R. Benabou, “Inequality and Growth,” NBER Macroeeconomics Annual, Vol. 11, 1996, pp. 11-74.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3585187

[3]   A. Shanmugaratnam, T. Velded, A. Mossige and M. Bovin, “Resource Management and Pastoral Institution Building in the West Africa Sahel,” World Bank Discussion Paper, Africa Technical Department Series 175, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992.

[4]   R. Johnson and G. Libecap, “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 5, 1982, pp. 1005-1022.

[5]   J.-P. Laurent, P. Mathieu and M. Totté, “Migrations et Access a la terre au Burkina Fasso,” Issue 20 of Cahiers du CIDEP, CIDEP, Paris, 1994.

[6]   A. Bergeret and J. C. Ribot, “L’abre Nourricier en Pays Sahelien,” Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’homme, Paris, 2001.

[7]   J. Dayton-Johnson and P. Bardhan, “Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretic al Exercise,” Economic Journal, Vol. 112, No. 481, 2002, pp. 577-602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00731

[8]   J. M. Baland and J. P. Platteau, “Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons, Part I: The Unregulated Case,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1997, pp. 451-482. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028620

[9]   J. M. Baland and J. P. Platteau, “The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management,” World Development, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1999, pp. 773-788.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00026-1

[10]   J. M. Baland, P. Bardhan, S. Das, D. Mookherjee and R. Sarkar, “Inequality, Collective Action, and the Environment: Evidence from Firewood Collection in Nepal,” In: J. M. Baland, P. Bardhan and S. Bowles, Eds., Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability, Chapter 10, Princeton University Press, 2006.

[11]   E. Ostrom and R. Gardner, “Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1993, pp. 93-112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.4.93

[12]   P. Dasgupta, “Poverty, Population and Natural Resources,” In: Selected Papers of Partha Dasgupta, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

[13]   K. Weinberger and J. Juetting, “Women’s Participation in Local Organizations: Conditions and Constraints,” World Development, Vol. 29, No. 8, 2002, pp. 1391-1404.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00049-3

[14]   S. Engel, M. Iskandarani and P. Useche, “Improved Water Supply in the Ghanaian Volta Basin: Who Uses It and Who Participates in Community Decision-Making? EPT Discussion, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC, 2005, p. 129.

[15]   F. J. Pichon, “Colonist Land-Allocation Decisions, Land Use, and Deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon Frontier,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1997, pp. 707-744.

[16]   M. Fachamps and B. Minten, “Returns to Social Network Capital among Traders,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2013, pp. 173-206.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/54.2.173

[17]   J. Maluccio, L. Haddad and J. May, “Social Capital and Household Welfare in South Africa, 1993-98,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36, No. 6, 2000, pp. 54-81.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380008422654

[18]   S. R. Curran, “Migration, Social Capital, and the Environment: Considering Migrant Selectivity and Networks in Relation to Coastal Ecosystems,” In: W. Lutz, A. Prskawetz and W. Sanderson, Eds., Population and Environment: Methods of Analysis, Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, 2002, pp. 89-125.

[19]   A. Portes, “Transnational Communities: Their Emergence and Significance in the Contemporary World-System,” In: R. P. Korzeniewicz and W. C. Smith, Eds., Latin America in The World-Economy, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1996, pp. 151-168.

[20]   A. Portes and J. Sensenbrenner, “Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, 1993, pp. 1320-1350.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/230191

[21]   A. Agarwal and C. Gibson, “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation,” World Development, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, pp. 629-649.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00161-2

[22]   P. Seabright, “Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 113-134.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.4.113

[23]   R. Bluffstone, “The Effect of Labor Market Performance on Deforestation in Developing Countries under Open Access: An Example from Rural Nepal,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1995, pp. 42-63.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1995.1030

[24]   World Bank, “World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development,” World Bank, Washington DC, 2005.

[25]   C. Valdivia, C. Jett, R. Quiroz, J. Gilles and S. Materer, “Peasant Household Strategies in the Andes and Potentials Users of Climate Forecasts,” Selected Paper, American Agricultural Economics Association Conference, Tampa, 2000.

[26]   P. Bardhan, “Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2000, pp. 847-65.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/452480

[27]   D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, 2002, pp. 1231-1294.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935025

[28]   S. Engerman and K. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies,” Economía, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 41-88.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/eco.2002.0013

[29]   A. Angelsen, “Agricultural Expansion and Deforestation: Modeling the Impact of Population, Market Forces, and Property Rights,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1999, pp. 185-218.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00108-4

[30]   A. Angelsen and D. Kaimanovitz, “When Does Technological Change in Agriculture Promote Deforestation?” In: D. R. Lee and C. B. Barrett, Eds., Tradeoffs or Synergies? Agricultural Intensification, Economic Development, and the Environment, CABI Publishing, New York, 2001, p. 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1079/9780851994352.0089

[31]   E. Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2000, pp. 137-158.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.137

 
 
Top