TEL  Vol.3 No.6 , December 2013
Cycles and Rationalization
ABSTRACT

This paper studies the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a finite number of agents and a finite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem). I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between a subset of agents. I characterize the profiles of agent preferences when the Paretian set has cycles.

 


Cite this paper
P. Lamirande, "Cycles and Rationalization," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 6, 2013, pp. 340-349. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.36056.
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