This paper provides an analysis of collusion in oligopolies from a
game-theoretic perspective. It first provides a basic survey of oligopoly
models and then uses game theory to analyze non-cooperative or tacit collusion
in these models, in a way that should be accessible to undergraduate economics
students. In this way, the author characterizes the conditions under which
collusive behavior might occur. Importantly, this paper draws its conclusions by using
relatively basic methods with which those foreign to the subject should
be able to understand.
Cite this paper
S. Wolf, "Non-Cooperative Collusion in Static and Dynamic Oligopolies," Theoretical Economics Letters
, Vol. 3 No. 6, 2013, pp. 317-321. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.36053
 R. Rees, “Tacit Collusion,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1993, pp. 27-40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/9.2.27
 J. Church and R. Ware, “Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach,” Irwin McGraw Hill, London, 2000.
 L. Cabral, “Barriers to Entry”, In: S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, Eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
 R. Gilbert, “The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1989, pp. 107-127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942764
 S. Martin, “Industrial Organization in Context,” Oxford UP, Oxford, 2010.
 S. Bowles and H. Gintis, “Cooperation,” In: S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, Eds., New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
 G. Bitsakakis, “Static and Dynamic Oligopoly,” Class Lecture, Pembroke College, Oxford University, 1-6 May 2012.