OJPP  Vol.3 No.4 , November 2013
Kant on Self-Awareness
Abstract: This paper has three main parts. First, I discuss Kant on self-awareness in terms of inner sense, why he failed to make this account coherent, and why he failed to give such an account. Second, I give two reasons why such an account is bound to be inadequate. In the last section, I discuss another attempt Kant was tempted to give in terms of transcendental self-awareness involving a nonsensory intuitive perception that helps solve some of his problems.
Cite this paper: Smythe, T. (2013). Kant on Self-Awareness. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 531-535. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34077.

[1]   Chisholm, R. M. (1969). On the observability of the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30, 29-31.

[2]   Hume, D. (1960). A treatise on human nature. London: Selby Bigge edi-tion.

[3]   Kant, I. (1902). Werke, presschift uber die fortscritte der metapysick (Vol. 20). Berlin.

[4]   Kant, I. (1902). Werke, reflexionen zur metaphysick (Vol. 18). Berlin.

[5]   Kant, I. (1902). Werke, supplement to anthropologie in pragmatischer hinsicht (Vol. 7). Karl Vorlander, Liepzig.

[6]   Kant, I. (1933). The critique of pure reason. London: George Allan and Unwin.

[7]   Paton, H. J. (1936). Kant’s metaphysic of experience. London: Methuen and Co.

[8]   Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-knowledge and self-identity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[9]   Smythe, T. W. (2010). Intuiting the self. In D. Ruelas, & V. Brisero (Eds.), Psychology of intuition. Nova Science Publishers.

[10]   Strawson. P. (1966). The bounds of sense. London: Methuen and Co.