TEL  Vol.3 No.5 B , September 2013
Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining
In this note, we provide a new explanation for the “failure” of plea bargaining. We show in a model of asymmetric information that a public prosecutor facing re-election takes cases to the courtroom to signal quality even when her welfare (absent retention motivation) is always higher from plea bargaining.

Cite this paper
S. Bandyopadhyay and B. McCannon, "Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5, 2013, pp. 40-44. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2007.
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