TEL  Vol.3 No.5 B , September 2013
Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
Author(s) Kyung Hwan Baik*
ABSTRACT

I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.


Cite this paper
K. Baik, "Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5, 2013, pp. 1-4. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2001.
References
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[8]   K. H. Baik and J. H. Lee, “Endogenous Timing in Contests with Delegation,” Economic Inquiry. In press. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00487.x

[9]   F. Szidarovszky and K. Okuguchi, “On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1997, pp. 135-140. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0517

 
 
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