TEL  Vol.3 No.5 A , September 2013
Fishery Fee and Tax Rate in an Oligopoly Industry with Entry and Exit

Over the last two decades, fisheries sector has been playing an important role in the global economy as a vibrant sector. By looking into the interactions among natural resources, human beings and government, this paper first briefly examines the issue of complicated conflicts in fisheries together with its influence on fisheries management. Under the assumption that the fishing resources will not be exhausted, this paper further reveals the particular conflicts between economic performance and community welfare by modelling the strategic interaction amongst the government and fishing firms based on the two stage non-cooperative game theory. With a dynamic model enclosed, this paper demonstrates with how the government establishes the fishing fee rate to achieve its primary goal and how the fishing firms react to the policy in each scenario. In the end, it concludes with some brief suggestions regarding policy-making for future work priorities. Although fishery industry is used as an example in this article, our main results, however, can be applied to any industries of oligopoly competitions with entry and exit.

Cite this paper
Y. Shao, K. Shen, W. Zhang and S. Yao, "Fishery Fee and Tax Rate in an Oligopoly Industry with Entry and Exit," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5, 2013, pp. 21-29. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A1004.
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