JFRM  Vol.2 No.1 , March 2013
Foreign Entry and Multi-Period Bank Competition Based on Collateral View
Abstract: This paper constructs the multi-period model of spatial bank competition between the local bank and the foreign bank with financing cost (efficiency) advantage, the results show that: 1) when the amount of the high risk borrowers in the marker reaches a threshold, both banks will use collateral as screening device to distinguish different risk borrowers, only low risk borrowers will borrow money from the bank; 2) the space distance (production differentiation) can help local bank confront the foreign bank’s cost (efficiency) advantage. Further comparative static analysis shows: the bank’s profit decreases with its financing cost, and the bank will require higher loan rate and less collateral with its financing cost increasing; Decreasing transaction cost and better legal environment will facilitate the bank to require more collateral and lower loan rate.
Cite this paper: Chen, X. (2013). Foreign Entry and Multi-Period Bank Competition Based on Collateral View. Journal of Financial Risk Management, 2, 1-9. doi: 10.4236/jfrm.2013.21001.

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