TEL  Vol.2 No.5 , December 2012
Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems
ABSTRACT

This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom and T. Yamato, Secure Implementation,Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203-229) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Z. Ritz, Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives,Mathematical Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 155-179), both of which are necessary for secure imple- mentation, if and only if it is constant on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. Weak in- difference is weaker than minimal richness (Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money, Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008, pp. 91-95). Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.


Cite this paper
K. Nishizaki, "Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 5, 2012, pp. 561-565. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.25103.
References
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