ABSTRACT In the context of instigating green construction technology by changing current technology practices, evolutionary game theory is used to solve path dependence problems that yield stable equilibrium. Replicating dynamic gaming shows that in inducing technological change some problems concerning multiple equilibrium definitely exist and that profit is the prime motivation to use or supply new technology. The model also shows that a lock-in of a current tech-nology can be broken as a consequence of players’ studies.
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