TEL  Vol.2 No.3 , August 2012
On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”
In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavilydestabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by thearrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly howstability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomenaaffecting the composition of the marriage market.

Cite this paper
J. Gabszewicz, F. Garcia, J. Pais and J. Resende, "On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 3, 2012, pp. 291-293. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23054.
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[2]   Y. Blum, A. E. Roth and U. G. Rothblum, “Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1997, pp. 362-411. doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2307