Complex Dynamics Analysis for Cournot Game with Bounded Rationality in Power Market

Affiliation(s)

College of Electrical and Information Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, China.

College of Electrical and Information Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, China.

Abstract

In order to accurately simulate the game behaviors of the market participants with bounded rationality, a new dynamic Cournot game model of power market considering the constraints of transmission network is proposed in this paper. The model is represented by a discrete differential equations embedded with the maximization problem of the social benefit of market. The Nash equilibrium and its stability in a duopoly game are quantitatively analyzed. It is found that there are different Nash equilibriums with different market parameters corresponding to different operating conditions of power network, i.e., congestion and non-congestion, and even in some cases there is not Nash equilibrium at all. The market dynamic behaviors are numerically simulated, in which the periodic or chaotic behaviors are focused when the market parameters are beyond the stability region of Nash equilibrium.

In order to accurately simulate the game behaviors of the market participants with bounded rationality, a new dynamic Cournot game model of power market considering the constraints of transmission network is proposed in this paper. The model is represented by a discrete differential equations embedded with the maximization problem of the social benefit of market. The Nash equilibrium and its stability in a duopoly game are quantitatively analyzed. It is found that there are different Nash equilibriums with different market parameters corresponding to different operating conditions of power network, i.e., congestion and non-congestion, and even in some cases there is not Nash equilibrium at all. The market dynamic behaviors are numerically simulated, in which the periodic or chaotic behaviors are focused when the market parameters are beyond the stability region of Nash equilibrium.

Cite this paper

nullH. Yang and Y. Zhang, "Complex Dynamics Analysis for Cournot Game with Bounded Rationality in Power Market,"*Journal of Electromagnetic Analysis and Applications*, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2009, pp. 48-60. doi: 10.4236/jemaa.2009.11009.

nullH. Yang and Y. Zhang, "Complex Dynamics Analysis for Cournot Game with Bounded Rationality in Power Market,"

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