IB  Vol.2 No.2 , June 2010
Inventories and Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms
Author(s) Kazuhiro Ohnishi
ABSTRACT
This paper considers a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm are allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device. The paper then shows that the equilibrium in the second period occurs at the Stackelberg point where the state-owned firm is the leader.

Cite this paper
nullK. Ohnishi, "Inventories and Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms," iBusiness, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2010, pp. 116-122. doi: 10.4236/ib.2010.22014.
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