ME  Vol.3 No.3 , May 2012
Strategic Interaction and Charitable Fundraising
Abstract: This paper studies strategic interaction between rival charities providing multiple public goods, highlighting the role of fundraising campaigns in influencing donor decision-making. The analysis suggests that, even when charities honor donor designation, social welfare may be higher in equilibrium when charities solicit donors sequentially, rather than simultaneously or through a United Fund.
Cite this paper: A. Amornrat Apinunmahakul and V. Barham, "Strategic Interaction and Charitable Fundraising," Modern Economy, Vol. 3 No. 3, 2012, pp. 338-345. doi: 10.4236/me.2012.33044.

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