ABSTRACT Speed economy, proposed by Japanese scholars Masaki Tamura, refers to get the cost savings flow by accelerating the transaction process , which brings the a large market space to the cargo/express delivery industry . Due to the rapidly growth of China air cargo/express market and the ongoing increasingly opening up of the sky, inter-national cargo/express giants have set up their hubs in China. The arrival of these global logistics integrators has brought a lot of influence to the development of airport. Hereinto, the unbalance between the scales of China cargo hubs and the rapid demand of air cargo/express development, the cooperation model of airports and air cargo/express have become the most urgently issue to explore. Therefore, on the basis of airport and airway co-competition analysis, the characteristics of the air cargo supply chain, and the airports and cargo airlines supply chain behavior, this paper will use the non-co- operative game of principal-agent model and the cooperative game model to analysis the revenue distribution of airport and cargo airway on the supply chain, this paper applies the cooperative game theory within a supply chain to analyze the cooperation model of airports and air cargo/express, so as to makes strategy suggestions on airport development.
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