IIM  Vol.1 No.3 , December 2009
Secure Signature Protocol
Abstract: This paper studies how to take advantage of other's computing ability to sign a message with one's private key without disclosing the private key. A protocol to this problem is presented, and it is proven, by well known simulation paradigm, that this protocol is private.
Cite this paper: nullS. LI, D. WANG and Y. DAI, "Secure Signature Protocol," Intelligent Information Management, Vol. 1 No. 3, 2009, pp. 174-179. doi: 10.4236/iim.2009.13026.

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