OJPS  Vol.9 No.1 , January 2019
Independent Redistricting Commissions and Electoral Competition in the US House of Representatives
Author(s) James de Vault
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes whether redistricting commissions impact electoral competition in the US House of Representatives. Data from the last three redistricting cycles are used to estimate a fixed-effects regression model that controls for state and time invariant effects. The model shows that independent redistricting commissions enhance electoral competition and that this effect has become stronger since the introduction of these commissions in Arizona and California. The model also shows that other types of redistricting commissions as a whole produce districts that are no more competitive than those produced by partisan-controlled legislative redistricting.
Cite this paper
Vault, J. (2019) Independent Redistricting Commissions and Electoral Competition in the US House of Representatives. Open Journal of Political Science, 9, 1-16. doi: 10.4236/ojps.2019.85001.
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