TEL  Vol.8 No.5 , April 2018
Environmental Policy for Non-Point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly
This study investigates the effectiveness of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions in an imperfect competition framework. To this end, following Ganguli and Raju, it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic firms choose their best prices and abatement technology, respectively. It is demonstrated in both games that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to a decrease in pollution. This finding indicates that the ambient charge can efficiently control pollution in a Bertrand duopoly.
Cite this paper
Matsumoto, A. , Nakayama, K. and Szidarovszky, F. (2018) Environmental Policy for Non-Point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly. Theoretical Economics Letters, 8, 1058-1069. doi: 10.4236/tel.2018.85073.
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