TEL  Vol.8 No.3 , February 2018
A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements
Author(s) Tamura Masaoki
This study examines the signaling roles of political parties and political advertising. Although politicians’ types are unobservable during an election, their party affiliations and political advertisements are observable to the voters. Through these two political behaviors, politicians can reveal their hidden types to the public. We extend Snyder and Ting to a multi-period model with the possibility of reelection and examine the roles and relationships of political parties and advertisements. We show that political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians’ types. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect their favored candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.
Cite this paper
Masaoki, T. (2018) A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements. Theoretical Economics Letters, 8, 241-255. doi: 10.4236/tel.2018.83018.
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